Exchange rate policies depend on portfolio choices, and portfolio choices depend on anticipated exchange rate policies. This opens the door to multiple equilibria in policy regimes. We construct a model in which agents optimally choose to denominate their assets and liabilities either in domestic or in foreign currency. The monetary authority optimally chooses to ßoat or to Þx the currency, after portfolios have been chosen. We identify conditions under which both Þxing and ßoating are equilibrium policies: if agents expect Þxing and arrange their portfolios accordingly, the monetary authority validates that expectation; the same happens if agents initially expect ßoating. We also show that a ßexible exchange rate Pareto-dominates a Þxed one. It follows that social welfare would rise if the monetary authority could precommit to ßoating.
Introduction
Emerging market countries have trouble letting their exchange rates ßoat, and many countries that claim to ßoat do not deliver on that promise. That is the conclusion of much recent empirical work, starting with Calvo and Reinhart (2002) and Stein et al. (1999) . The reason, these papers argue, 1 is a lethal mix of dollarization of liabilities and balance sheet effects: if corporate debts are denominated in dollars while Þrms depend on local currency revenues (or, more precisely, corporate revenues increase with the relative price of goods produced at home), sharp and unexpected changes in relative prices are harmful to Þnancial stability. The policy conclusion is that ßexible exchange rates can be destabilizing, and therefore emerging market nations would be well advised to design alternative monetary arrangements, including currency boards and dollarization.
Such a view has become extremely inßuential, but even its most ardent advocates understand that it is only half the story. The claim is that ßoating is not feasible given that debts are dollarized. But, presumably, borrowers choose the amounts of debt to issue as peso and dollar-denominated bonds taking into account the risk-return characteristics of these securities. Recognizing that variances and covariances (especially with consumption) should then matter, Ize and Levy-Yeyati (2003), Ize and Parrado (2003) , and Morón and Castro (2003) have extended standard portfolio theory to model endogenous dollarization in emerging markets. Their approach, however, takes as given the structure of shocks and, more importantly for our purposes, monetary and exchange rate policies.
So the recent debate has emphasized that exchange rate policies depend on portfolio choices, and also that portfolio choices depend on anticipated exchange rate policies. The next question is inevitable: what are the implications of this interaction once both portfolios and exchange rate policy are endogenous? In particular, what are the resulting policy outcomes? Is there a single outcome, or several ones? These are the issues that this paper focuses on.
We build an extremely simple model of a small open economy in which domestic residents can borrow internationally by issuing bonds denominated in both home and foreign currency. The currency composition of debt plays a nontrivial role because markets are incomplete: bonds are promises to nominal payoffs that can only imperfectly (or not at all) depend on the realization of the state of nature. We also assume sticky wages. Then monetary and exchange rate policy matters through two channels: as in textbook models, in the presence of external shocks, ßexible exchange rates stabilize labor supply and output at the expense of making the real exchange rate more volatile; and, as emphasized in the more recent literature, unexpected changes in the real exchange rate may affect wealth and exacerbate the volatility of domestic consumption, if domestic residents are long in one currency and short in the other. As a consequence, the optimal exchange rate policy chosen by a benevolent central bank depends on the existence and extent of currency mismatches. But the latter are determined, in turn, by the optimizing decisions of domestic borrowers and, hence, by expectations of exchange rate policy.
The equilibrium outcome of this interaction is an exchange rate regime and a market allocation such that the market allocation is a competitive equilibrium given the exchange rate regime, and the central bank cannot increase social welfare by deviating to a different exchange regime. We assume that the central bank chooses the exchange rate regime (whether to Þx the nominal exchange rate or to Þx the domestic price level and let the exchange rate ßoat) after debts and wage contracts have been written. Then market expectations about exchange rate policy play a crucial role in shaping equilibria.
If bonds are non-contingent promises to either home or foreign currency, we Þnd there is always an equilibrium with ßoating exchange rates. So, if agents expect the central bank will ßoat, they arrange their wage and debt contracts accordingly; given that, the central bank indeed Þnds it optimal to ßoat. But in some cases there is also an equilibrium with Þxed exchange rates: if agents expect Þxed rates, they choose wages and portfolios that make it optimal for the central bank to Þx ex post. That is, we can have multiple equilibria in policy regimes.
When there are multiple equilibria, they can be Pareto-ranked. We show that, if utility functions are quadratic or display constant relative risk aversion, the equilibrium involving ßexible rates yields higher expected welfare. So if the economy is in a situation in which there are two equilibrium policy regimes, and arbitrary expectations cause the Þxed rates equilibrium to materialize, then expected welfare will be inefficiently low. Welfare would increase if the central bank could precommit to ßoat the currency, regardless of the composition of agents' portfolios.
We also study the case in which domestic bonds are indexed to the price of home output. Equilibrium policy regimes turn out to be harder to pin down. Still, under some further assumptions we are able to identify conditions for Þxed rates and ßexible rates to be equilibrium policy regimes. Again, there is a range of parameters for which both regimes occur in equilibrium. In those cases, a policy of ßexible rates again delivers higher expected welfare than do Þxed rates.
Our discussion is close in spirit to that in Chamon and Hausmann (2002) . In that paper, if domestic Þrms have large dollar liabilities, unexpected changes in the real exchange rate can drive the Þrms into costly bankruptcy. The central bank can react to shocks by allowing the interest rate or the exchange rate to move. If domestic Þrms expect a policy of stable exchange rates they will borrow in dollars, which ex post may cause the monetary authority to validate such expectations for fear of bankrupting the Þrms. Hence one can have more than one equilibrium policy.
Self-validating policy regimes also appear in Corsetti and Pesenti (2002) , but in a very different setting. That paper studies price-setting by Þrms and the choice of monetary policy by the government. There can be two equilibria. In one, Þrms preset prices in domestic currency only, and foreign-currency prices are determined by the law of one price. Floating exchange rates are then the optimal policy regime. In the second equilibrium Þrms preset prices in local currency, and a monetary union is the optimal policy choice.
Our policy message here is similar to that in Caballero and Krishnamurty (2004) , who analyze a model in which Þnancial market imperfections lead agents to under-provide insurance against liquidity shocks. In that model ßoating the exchange rate is powerless to ameliorate shocks once the quantity of insurance has been chosen, but can help ex ante to induce agents to take greater precautions against shocks. Hence Caballero and Krishnamurty also argue for precommitting to a ßoat, though for reasons very different from ours.
The next section outlines the basic model, and section 3 presents the basic results. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case in which peso bonds are indexed, while section 5 concludes. Some technical material is delayed to an appendix.
The model
Consider a single-period, small open economy populated by households and Þrms. The representative household owns the typical Þrm and receives its profits.
There are two goods, one produced at home and one produced abroad. The two goods are imperfect substitutes and both tradable. For simplicity, we assume that domestic households consume only the foreign good.
There is a domestic currency, called peso, which is issued by a domestic central bank. There is also a foreign currency called dollar. Foreign goods have a constant price of one in terms of dollars, so we speak indistinctly of dollars and foreign goods.
To Þnance operations, at the beginning of the period under study home Þrms borrow from the world market, here represented by a continuum of risk-neutral lenders. The key assumption in this section is that the typical Þrm can borrow or lend in pesos or dollars. Therefore, the Þrm's optimal borrowing policy determines the degree of "dollarization" in the economy, and will be inßuenced by the Þrm's expectations about equilibrium prices and the exchange rate. The latter are determined by the monetary policy chosen by the central bank, which in turn takes into account the degree of dollarization.
Firms
The representative Þrm has access to the technology
where 0 < α < 1 and A is a positive parameter. For simplicity, we also assume that the capital stock K is of Þxed size. Households are heterogeneous in the labor services they provide, and the input L is an aggregate of the services of the different households in the economy:
where we have indexed workers by i in the unit interval, L i denotes the services purchased from household i, and θ > 1 is the elasticity of demand for household i's services. Let W i denote the wage charged by worker i and W denote the aggregate wage, that is, the minimum cost of a unit of the L aggregate, expressed in terms of pesos. Cost minimization yields the demand for household i 0 s labor:
The Þrm has no capital to start with, so it must Þnance capital purchases by borrowing abroad. To do this, at the beginning of the period, the Þrm sells bonds denominated either in pesos (B) or dollars (B * ). A peso (resp. dollar) bond is a promise to a peso (resp. dollar) at the end of the period. Note that, in assuming that bond payments cannot be arbitrary functions of the state of nature, we are imposing market incompleteness, which implies that currency composition plays a nontrivial role.
We assume that the world interest rate in dollars is zero, so a dollar bond must sell for one dollar. Letting Q denote the price in dollars of a peso bond, it follows that
End of period Þrm proÞts, in dollars, are denoted by Π and given by
where S is the exchange rate (in pesos per dollar) and P the peso price of home output. As usual, we assume that L is chosen at the end of the period, after uncertainty has been revealed.
Since the Þrm is owned by the representative household, it is natural to assume its objective function be E {u 0 (C)Π}, where u 0 (C) is the marginal utility of the household's consumption, to be derived below, and E {.} denotes the expectation at the beginning of the period. Hence the Þrm chooses B, B * , and a contingent plan for L so maximize E {u 0 (C)Π} subject to 2, 3, and 4. The solution is
and
which are standard. In particular, 5 characterizes the Þrm's optimal borrowing policy: issuing an additional unit of peso bonds costs Q dollars at the beginning of the period, and requires a dollar repayment of 1/S dollars at the end of the period. At the margin, the expected utility net gain from such issue must be zero.
Households
As already mentioned, households provide differentiated labor services, so each household enjoys some monopoly power in the labor market. We assume that, at the beginning of the period, each household sets a wage in pesos, and commits to satisfy demand forthcoming at that wage at the end of the period. The household consumes the dollar value of its labor income plus Þrm proÞts.
Formally, household i chooses its wage,
and to the labor demand function 2. The functions u and v satisfy usual assumptions, and θ > 1.
The optimal wage solves
where we have imposed symmetry and eliminated i subscripts.
Foreign lenders
Foreign lenders are risk neutral and only care about foreign goods. Hence they will buy peso bonds if and only if their expected return, in dollars, equals the dollar world return of zero. Therefore,
Market clearing
Since local residents do not consume home goods, the demand for home output comes from foreigners. We assume that the value of the foreign demand for home output is exogenous and given by a random variable X. We assume that E(X) > K and that X is the only source of uncertainty in the model. As a consequence, the demand function is simply given by
Competitive equilibrium is well deÞned once monetary policy is given. Before proceeding to the analysis of policy, note that in any competitive equilibrium household consumption is obtained by combining 3, 4, 7, and 9
The Þrst equality says that consumption equals the dollar value of output minus the cost of servicing the foreign debt. But 10 implies that, again in equilibrium, the dollar value of output is given by X, while the debt burden is equal to the initial cost of investment (K) minus the capital gains or losses on peso debt associated with an exchange rate surprise (the last term on the RHS). So in this model the extent of debt dollarization cannot affect the expected value of consumption. Dollarization can affect the variability of consumption, but this depends on the distribution of the exchange rate and, hence, on policy.
Equilibrium monetary policy
We restrict attention to two policy alternatives: a Þxed exchange rate, deÞned as a policy that keeps S constant, and a ßexible exchange rate, which keeps P constant. This section studies the equilibrium outcomes, in particular the degree of dollarization, under either ßexible rates and Þxed rates. Then we ask whether either alternative is an equilibrium policy.
Competitive equilibrium under a ßexible exchange rate
As mentioned earlier, ßexible exchange rates are deÞned as a regime in which the price of home output is constant. The resulting outcomes will be denoted by tildes. Clearly the price level is immaterial, so we normalizeP = 1. Equilibrium in the labor market (equation 6) reduces tõ
But by 1 output is a function only ofL, andW is set in advance. It follows that bothỸ andL must be constant under ßexible rates. 2 Intuitively, since monetary policy stabilizes the price of home output and nominal wages are preset, the real (product) wage is constant. Hence the marginal product of labor, labor demand, and output must be constant too. The nominal exchange rate, however, is not constant. By 10,
so the distribution of the exchange rate is given by the distribution of exports X.
In particular, the nominal exchange rate appreciates when exports are higher. What is the optimal portfolio allocation? Using 9 in the Þrst-order condition 5,
Equilibrium portfolios are such that the marginal utility of consumption is orthogonal to the terms of trade. The Þrm accomplished this by choosing B and B * so as to make consumption constant. From 11 and the fact that under
which is therefore the optimal portfolio allocation. The intuition is straightforward. Given that labor effort is constant and so is the wage, the only risk the household faces is exchange rate risk, which can cause the price of domestic output in terms of consumption goods to ßuctuate. The Þrm eliminates this risk on behalf of its owner, the household, by borrowing an amount in pesos equal to the (constant) value of output. This way the household is fully hedged against (real and nominal) exchange rate risk.
The corresponding constant consumption level is, by 11 and 13,
So, in equilibrium with ßexible rates, the household consumes the expected dollar value of home output minus the cost of capital.
Note that under this allocationQB =Ỹ E n 1/S o = E {X} > K is necessary for consumption to be positive. This means that initially the Þrm sells peso bonds with a higher value than its total foreign liability K, and devote some of the proceeds to buying dollar assets. So the Þrm becomes a net creditor in dollars and a net debtor in pesos. This ensures that capital gains obtain when the exchange rate depreciates, which are the exact circumstances in which the dollar value of national income is low.
To complete the characterization of the equilibrium, observe that nominal wages are given by the optimal wage setting condition 8, which reduces to 3
3.2 Is a ßexible exchange rate an equilibrium policy?
Suppose that for some reason agents expect a policy of ßoating and set wages and portfolios accordingly. Given those expectations, will the monetary authority deliver that policy ex-post? In other words, are expectations of ßoating selfvalidating? To answer these questions, here we consider whether ßoating is an equilibrium policy. For the interaction between endogenous portfolio selection and monetary and exchange rate policy, the timing of moves is crucial. We assume the following: the period under analysis start with a contracting stage in which Þrms issue bonds and workers set the value of their nominal wages. Then the central bank chooses the policy regime, either Þxed or ßexible exchange rates. The authorities take no other action after that. Finally, uncertainty about exports is realized and production, trade and consumption take place.
We assume that, in choosing the policy regime, the central bank maximizes the welfare of its representative citizen. Floating exchange rates are then an equilibrium policy if the central bank has no incentive to deviate for Þxed exchange rates, given the portfolios and wage contracts were optimally written in the expectation of ßexible rates. 4 A general analysis of equilibrium policies turns out to be very complex. To simplify, we impose that, if the central bank is to deviate from ßexible to Þxed rates, the deviation must leave the expected dollar value of pesos unchanged at its pre-deviation level. This restriction is not only for tractability, but also to focus on domestic policy concerns and abstract from the (better known) time inconsistency issues associated with foreign debt: it ensures that a deviation implies no expected expropriation of foreign lenders. This may be justiÞed by the existence of costs of international default.
Denote outcomes under a deviation to Þxed exchange rates by an overbar. By assumption, after a policy deviation 1/S must equal E n 1/S o which, given 13, requires the exchange rate be Þxed at
Also, 6 and 10 must hold, so labor effort is given bȳ
where the nominal wage rate is that associated with ßexible rates, since it was set before the deviation. Using the deÞnition ofS from 15 in 16 we then obtain labor effort under a deviation:
Hence labor effort becomes a linear function of X, with expectation
In words, the deviation to Þxed exchange rates keeps expected labor supply the same, but increases the variability of labor effort. The latter obtains because Þxing the exchange rate means that the price of home output, and hence the real wage, must ßuctuate in order to accommodate shocks to export demand.
Using 11 and the fact that the deviation keeps 1/S at E(1/S), consumption after a deviation to Þxed rates is given bȳ
Taking expectations of this expression we again have that
Hence, the deviation also causes a mean-preserving spread in consumption. The analysis shows that, by deviating from ßexible rates to Þxed rates when households had expected the former, the monetary authority induces volatility into labor supply and consumption without changing the expected value of either variable. Since volatility decreases expected utility, the policymaker can only decrease expected utility by switching to Þxed rates. It follows that ßexible exchange rates are always an equilibrium policy regime.
Competitive equilibrium under a Þxed exchange rate
Now consider a policy of Þxing the exchange rate at S =S = 1 (we use overbars to denote Þxed rates). Then nominal demand reduces tō
and 6 gives labor effort:L
So labor effort becomes proportional to the demand for home output. Employment must ßuctuate since, with Þxed exchange rates, the price of home output and the product wage must ßuctuate to accommodate changes in demand.
Expression 11 for consumption becomes
Home consumption is equal to X minus the constant value of investment. The reasons is clear from 11: since the exchange rate is Þxed, home agents experience no unanticipated capital gains nor losses. For the same reasons B and B * are indeterminate, since bonds in pesos and dollars are now perfect substitutes. This means that portfolio composition may be pinned down by other things outside the model.
Finally, nominal wages are given by 8, which reduces tō
3.4 Is a Þxed exchange rate an equilibrium policy?
To check whether a Þxed rate is an equilibrium policy, consider a deviation to a ßexible exchange rate, assuming that in such a deviation E n 1/S o = 1/S = 1. Again, the justiÞcation for the restriction is to ensure that the deviation imposes no expected expropriation on foreigners.
After a switch, 10 must hold, so that
By assumption, the expectation of the LHS after a deviation must equal unity. But the deviation also implies that bothP andỸ are constant. Hence, taking expectation on both sides of the preceding equation, and using 10 again, we Þnd the exchange rate associated with the deviation,
Applying this to 6 we have that labor supply is given bỹ
Comparing this last expression with 18 we see that after a deviation to ßoating labor effort is no longer variable, and its mean value does not change. Hence there is a "temptation" to abandon Þxed rates.
To Þnd the effect on consumption of a switch to ßexible rates, use 21 in 11 evaluated at E n 1/S o = 1. This yields
Hence the effect of the deviation on consumption depends on the degree of dollarization, which is indeterminate under Þxed rates. But notice that E nCo = E {X} − K, so the deviation keeps the expected value of consumption constant. Therefore, expected utility from consumption may increase or fall depending on the response of the variability of consumption to the deviation.
From 22 we see that after a deviation the variance of consumption must fall if 0 < B < 2E {X}, and it must increase otherwise. If the variance falls, the policymaker will unambiguously want to deviate, since that would reduce the variance of both consumption and labor supply while preserving their expected values. For instance, if (by ßuke) agents had adopted the portfolio that corresponds to the expectation of ßexible rates, the variance of consumption after the switch would fall to zero, and deviating from Þxed rates would be optimal for the policymaker.
It follows that a necessary condition for Þxed rates to an equilibrium policy is either B < 0 or B > 2E {X}. The Þrst case is perhaps the more interesting one: the representative agent has gross assets in pesos and gross debts in dollars. In equilibrium, this currency mismatch makes no difference to him nor to lenders. But it deters the government from abandoning Þxed exchange rates. Dollarization of liabilities gives rise to fear of ßoating.
Summarizing: if is either B < 0 or B > 2E {X}, the switch to ßexible rates induces a mean-preserving spread on consumption relative to Þxed exchange rates. Since the deviation keeps labor effort at its mean value under Þxed rates, Þxed exchange rates may or may not be an equilibrium. This depends on the parameters of the model and, in particular, on the utility cost associated with consumption ßuctuations relative to labor effort ßuctuations (determined by the shape and curvature of u and v). But also, and importantly for our purposes, it depends on the currency composition of the Þrm's debt, which is not uniquely pinned down in equilibrium.
If a Þxed exchange rate is in fact an equilibrium, then there are multiple equilibria in policy regimes, since ßexible exchange rates are always an equilibrium. In that case, animal spirits play a role: if agents expect Þxed rates (and B < 0 or B > 2E {X}) the government will indeed deliver Þxed rates; if agents expect ßexible rates, the government will choose ßexible rates.
Example: Suppose
The equilibrium wage is then given by inserting 19 and 18 in 20:
One can then calculate that switching from Þxed rates to Þxed rates increases the expected cost of labor effort by
The switch also causes an expected change in the utility of consumption of
Assuming that either condition holds, Þxed exchange rates are an equilibrium policy if
For any givenB, this condition is satisÞed if either θ or α are close enough to one.
Welfare
Our analysis implies that both ßexible rates and Þxed exchange rates can be equilibrium policies in our model. Importantly, they can also be Pareto ranked when they coexist.
We have already shown that expected consumption must be the same under both policy regimes, and that ßexible exchange rates completely stabilize both consumption and labor effort. However, it is hard to compare the mean value of labor effort under the two regimes. Hence the welfare ranking may depend on functional forms and parameter values.
However, there is no ambiguity if utility functions are CRRA or quadratic: ßexible rates perform better. To see this formally, assume Þrst that preferences are of the form
Under ßoating, 14 and 12 yield
where we have used the fact that with the assumed utility function Lv 0 (L) = L 1+χ , and also the fact that under ßoatingC = E {X} − K. Using 24 in 23 yields
With analogous steps one can derive an expression for expected utility under
Þxing, which is
Comparing 25 and 26 we see that EU ßex > EU fix . The appendix analyzes the case in which both u (C) and v (L) are quadratic, and shows that E © U ßex ª > E © U Þx ª also. We conclude that for two broadly used classes of preferences, the regime with ßexible exchange rates yields higher expected welfare. In those cases, if both ßexible and Þxed rates are equilibrium policy regimes, benevolent policymakers must endeavor to convince agents that ßoating will indeed be the chosen policy. One alternative is to commit to a ßexible regime. If this is not possible, direct regulation of portfolios so as to make ßexible rates optimal ex post could also be desirable. Recent attempts at "de-dollarizing" Þnancial contracts may be justiÞed, then, as coordination devices.
Indexed bonds
Readers might wonder whether the results on the multiplicity of equilibrium policy regimes are an artiÞce of the indeterminacy of portfolios under Þxed rates. That is not so, as we show in this section by extending the model to a menu of assets that ensures that portfolios are always fully determined.
We replace peso bonds with bonds that have payoffs indexed to the price of the domestic good. Such bonds are common in emerging markets. More precisely, we assume that the representative Þrm sells dollar bonds and indexed bonds. An indexed bond is a promise to P pesos at the end of the period.
Rather than developing the model from scratch, we simply write down the equilibrium conditions that differ from those of the earlier formulation. Foreign lenders again arbitrage the returns on both kinds of loans, so the initial price of an indexed bond, in dollars, must equal the expected terms of trade E {P/S}.
The optimal wage setting condition 8 remains the same, while the optimal portfolio condition 5 becomes
Market clearing is still given by 10, while expression 11 for consumption becomes
where B now denotes the outstanding number of indexed bonds.
A ßexible exchange rate once again
Consider Þrst a ßexible rates regime withP = 1. Assuming that this policy is credible and indeed carried out, indexed bonds become identical to peso bonds. Hence the outcomes are just the same as with ßexible exchange rates in the model with peso bonds, characterized in subsection 3.1. Notice in particular thatB =Ỹ , that is, indexed bonds in the portfolio are equal to the value of home output. Indexed bonds do make a difference, however, in analyzing whether ßexible rates are an equilibrium policy regime. Consider the implications of a deviation towards Þxed exchange rates. Again to prevent expected expropriation of foreign lenders, we assume that such a deviation leaves the expected terms of trade, P/S, unchanged. Using overbars once more to denote the consequences of a deviation to Þxed rates, this requires
where the last equality follows from 10.
To solve for the consequences of a deviation, note that 6 implies
Moreover, from 10, we havē
where the last equality follows from 30, 1 and 12. It follows that
Taking expectations and using 29 one obtains the nominal exchange rate under a feasible deviation:S
Inserting this value in 31 and simplifying one gets the price level after a deviation:P
So, in particular,
Hence a switch from ßexible rates to Þxed rates implies a fall in the expected price of home output. It follows that the expected real wage rises, and expected labor effort falls. Formally, from 30, 32 and the deÞnition ofỸ one can derivē
Taking expectations we have
Hence, the deviation to Þxed rates implies that labor effort becomes variable but, in contrast with the case of peso bonds, the mean value of labor effort falls. The reduction in mean labor effort is welfare-improving, making a switch towards Þxed rates attractive. 5 As in the case of peso bonds, the switch from ßexible to Þxed exchange rates causes a mean-preserving spread in consumption (the proof is similar to the one in the case of peso bonds and left to the interested reader.) Additional consumption variability makes expected welfare fall and reduces the desirability of the deviation, as in the case of peso bonds. However, with indexed bonds, mean labor effort falls. Flexible rates are an equilibrium if the utility beneÞt associated with the smaller labor effort is less than the cost associated with increased variability in both consumption and labor.
As a special case, assume that
where φ > 0 is an arbitrary constant and χ > 0. Assume also that X is lognormally distributed. Then, as we show in the appendix, the sign of E © v(L) ª −v(L) equals the sign of χ − α. A switch from ßexible rates to Þxed rates increases or leaves the same the expected cost of effort if χ ≥ α. Since the switch always causes a mean-preserving spread in consumption, then χ ≥ α is sufficient for the switch to be welfare-decreasing -that is, for ßexible rates to be an equilibrium policy.
The intuition is that the larger is χ, the larger is the utility cost of the increased variability of labor effort under a deviation. On the other hand, by 30, a larger α results in smaller ßuctuations in labor effort in a deviation. So the cost of a switch from a ßexible to a Þxed exchange rate increases with χ and falls with α.
A Þxed exchange rate once again
Consider next the policy of Þxing the exchange rate atS = 1. Condition 18 still gives labor effort, and 28 implies that
This expression shows that, in contrast with the case of nominal peso bonds, the currency composition of the debt matters here even with Þxed exchange rates. The central bank can peg the nominal exchange rate but not the terms of trade; if peso bonds are indexed, capital gains and losses depend on the latter.
As a consequence,B is not indeterminate. Instead, it must be set to satisfy the condition 27, which here reduces to
The price of home output follows from 17 and the production function:
The rest of the analysis turns out to be more difficult than before, so we assume from now on that u(C) is quadratic (at least in the relevant range). Then u 0 is linear in C, and the previous expression reduces to
That is, equilibrium portfolios must be set so that consumption is orthogonal to the terms of trade. Using the previous expression forC one readily Þnds that the stock of indexed bonds in the equilibrium portfolio is
This is intuitive: with quadratic utility,B must be chosen to minimize the variance of consumption which, from 36, is the variance of X −BP . HenceB is the coefficient of a linear regression of X onP . Given 37 the preceding expression can be written as
Replacing 38 in 36 yields equilibrium consumption:
Now consider a deviation to ßexible rates, imposing once more the restriction of no expropriation to foreign lenders, which requires that the post-deviation expected value E nP /S o must equal E ©P ª . After the deviation, 6 must hold, which together with the production function yields labor effort:L
whereP is the price level after the deviation, to be determined shortly. Since 10 must hold,P /S = X/Ỹ . Taking expectations on both sides and using the production function and 40 one obtains
But this has to be equal to E ©P ª , whereP is given by 37. So, taking expectations in 37, equating the result to the preceding equation and rearranging gives the required value ofP :
Replacing in the equation forL above we obtaiñ
The inequality follows from Jensen's inequality. Switching to ßexible rates stabilizes labor effort, but at a level that is higher than the mean value of L under Þxed rates. The sum of these two effects on the representative household's welfare is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the model. The effect of the deviation on consumption can be calculated from
Using 10 once more and after some tedious algebra one obtains
Recalling 39, one readily notices that E ©Cª = E nCo : the deviation leaves the expected value of consumption unchanged. But the effect on consumption variance is unclear, although the expressions forC andC reveal that it depends solely on α and the distribution of X.
Multiplicity of policy regimes: a special case
When are a Þxed and a ßexible exchange rate both equilibrium policy regimes?
We can identify precise conditions for this to happen if X is lognormal and v is of the form 35, which we assume from now on. Then, as the appendix shows, a switch from Þxed rates to ßexible rates must increase the variance of consumption. The appendix also shows that the switch increases the expected cost of effort if α > χ, leaves it the same if α = χ, and reduces it otherwise. As a consequence, α ≥ χ is sufficient (not necessary) for Þxed rates to an equilibrium policy.
Recall from the discussion at the end of the last subsection that χ ≥ α is also sufficient for ßexible rates to be an equilibrium policy. It follows that both ßexible rates and Þxed rates are equilibrium outcomes if α and χ are sufficiently close to each other. Hence, the fact that peso bonds are indexed does not eliminate the possibility of multiple equilibria in this model.
If both ßexible rates and Þxed rates are equilibrium outcomes, the appendix shows thatB * is larger thanB * in absolute value. That is, under Þxed rates the Þrm issues more indexed debt and purchases more dollar assets than under ßexible rates. Why? The intuition is as follows. Flexible exchange rates stabilize the price of home output, the real wage, and therefore labor effort. The home portfolio is then structured to eliminate ßuctuations in consumption.
With Þxed exchange rates, by contrast, the price of home output and labor employment ßuctuate. An adverse shock to exports X, for example, lowersP andL and increases leisure. Portfolios are structured ex ante so that when leisure rises, consumption rises too. The Þrm accomplishes this by issuing more indexed debt than under ßexible rates, so that there is a bigger capital gain whenP falls and the real exchange rate depreciates.
Finally, the appendix shows that if both Þxed and ßexible exchange rates are equilibria, ßexible rates again yields higher welfare. In such a case, Þxed exchange rates may occur as a coordination failure: if agents expect Þxing and arrange their portfolios accordingly, the monetary authority will validate those expectations, and social welfare will be inefficiently low. As in the case with peso bonds, enabling the monetary authority to commit to a policy of ßexible rates would raise social welfare. Alternatively, direct controls on portfolio shares could also be welfare-improving.
Final remarks
We have built a model in which both portfolio composition and monetary policies are determined optimally. A key implication is that, since optimal portfolios depend on policy and viceversa, there may be more than one equilibrium policy regime. This suggests that the fear of ßoating that allegedly obtains in many countries may be an artifact of arbitrary expectations. For certain parameter values and shock distributions, expectations may be self-validating: if agents expect Þxing and arrange their portfolios accordingly, the monetary authority will indeed deliver a Þxed exchange rate. What the literature on fear of ßoating fails to take into account is that the same would happen if agents expected a policy of ßexible exchange rates: assets and liabilities would be denominated in such a way as to make ßoating optimal for the authorities.
Which equilibrium the economy lands on matters. We are able to show that for plausible functional forms and lognormality of the shock, ßexing delivers higher expected social welfare than does Þxing. Therefore, policies that anchor expectations on the ßexible rates outcome -or, alternatively, induce agents to hold a portfolio that is compatible with ßexing-raise social welfare.
One limitation of the analysis is that here portfolio composition is endogenous, but only given the exogenous restrictions on the menu of assets. While we have allowed for an asset menu that included more than the usual noncontingent world currency bonds, it may be desirable and useful to derive market incompleteness from more fundamental assumptions on the environment. That remains a substantial task, however, and at this point we can only leave it for future research.
A second limitation, of course, is that we have imposed strong restrictions on the environment and policy options. These restrictions were justiÞed on the basis of tractability and analytical convenience, but obviously they will have to be relaxed if the model is to be the basis for more realistic policy evaluation.
A Appendix
Proof of claims at the end of section 3. Assume preferences are such that
Then, under ßexible rates, 24 in the text is Lv 0
where we have used the fact thatC = E {X}−K. Plugging 44 into 43, expected utility becomes
Under Þxing, given thatC = X − K, wage setting equation 20 in the text can be written as 
Therefore,
Divide both sides of the last equation by v(L) and take logs:
log
where from the second equality on we have assumed that log X is normal with mean µ and variance σ 2 . The claim follows.
Proof of claims at the end of subsection 4.2. Recall that with Þxed rates, consumption is given by (39), so its variance is:
Cov(X, X α ) V arX α X α= V ar(X) · 1 − Cov 2 (X, X α ) (V arX)(V arX α )A switch to ßexible rates implies that consumption is given by (42), with variance:
Hence the sign of V arC − V arC equals the sign of
Assume again that log X ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ). Then, EX α = Ee α log X = e µ+σ 2 /2 and so on. Some very tedious algebra then gives:
and Cov 2 (X, X α ) (V arX)(V arX α ) = ³ e ασ 2 − 1´2 ¡ e α 2 σ 2 − 1 ¢ ¡ e σ 2 − 1 ¢ Change variables and deÞne z = e σ 2 . Note that z depends on σ 2 , the variance of log X,and is always greater than one. Replacing in 47 and simplifying one Þnds that the sign of V arC − V arC is given by the sign of z 1+α + z α(1+α) + z + z α 2 − 2z α − 2z 1+α 2 We have not been able to Þnd the sign of this polynomial analytically, but a graph of the above expression for α in [0, 1] and z > 1 makes it obvious that the sign is positive. It follows that a switch from Þx to ßex increases the variance of consumption.
To Þnd the effect of the switch on the expected cost of effort, note that under Þxed rates labor effort is given by:
while 41 says that a switch stabilizes labor effort at
Assuming 35 and replacing in the above one Þnds that:
If log X ∼ N (µ, σ 2 ), after taking logs the preceding expression simpliÞes further to: Trade, production and consumption take place Figure 1 
